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Machiavelli and the
liberalism of fear
Thomas Osborne
University of Bristol, UK
Abstract
This article revisits the long-standing question of the relations between ethics and
politics in Machiavelli’s work, assessing its relevance to the ‘liberalism of fear’ in par-
ticular in the work of Judith Shklar, Bernard Williams and also John Dunn. The article
considers ways in which Machiavelli has been a ‘negative’ resource for liberalism – for
instance, as a presumed proponent of tyranny; but also ways in which even for the
liberalism of fear he might be considered a ‘positive’ resource, above all around the
issues of political necessity and prudential judgement.
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There is an obvious irrepressibility about Machiavelli. To paraphrase Montesquieu, who
was by no means unequivocally hostile to Machiavelli: we will always need to be cured
of him (Montesquieu, 1989: 389). Whether as negative foil or inspiration, Machiavelli is
an iterative presence in political thought; and this is not just a matter of ‘history’ but of
each conjuncture, since every generation focuses on a different Machiavelli, and in
various kinds of reaction to him. Iteration can take different forms; sometimes Machia-
velli has been a ‘scandal’ to which political thought must supply an answer; sometimes
he has been a resource, even for traditions that would otherwise appear to run counter
to him.
The liberal tradition – or rather traditions, since there is no one liberal tradition –
would be a case in point. It is not that Machiavelli in any way ‘anticipates’
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liberalism, or even is a ‘precursor’ to it in any direct sense (cf. Manent, 1996; Laski,
1962: 12). But Machiavelli has been a constant provocation and also, at varying
times and at varying intensities, a resource for liberalism. In the postwar period, this
sense of being a resource came largely through the Machiavelli of the Discorsi
rather than the seemingly diabolically inclined author of Il Principe, a fairly long-
standing theme which culminated – albeit in a form that is certainly more republican
than liberal – in the work of Quentin Skinner (Skinner, 1998a; Skinner, 1998b: 46–7,
63–4). Here, anyway, Machiavelli emerges as a pre-liberal thinker of the liberties,
concerned with issues to do with the promotion, protection and indeed the govern-
ance of liberty. The ‘diabolic’ Machiavelli specifically of Il Principe has had a
different history of course, although here too there have been attempts to redeem
his insights for something like liberalism; for instance, in the writings of Isaiah
Berlin, considered briefly below, but also – albeit in a very different way – within
the tradition of the history of ideas itself, where Il Principe has come to be regarded
not as a wholly disjunct version of Machiavelli from that of the Discorsi but as one
tied to it in complex ways as well as to other writings in the genre of princely
political tactics (Skinner, 1998a).
The purpose of this article is to pursue a related but different line. It investigates the
extent to which Machiavelli might be a resource – on the face of it, certainly an unlikely
one – for a specific kind of liberalism, the liberalism of fear (Shklar, 1998; Williams,
2005). Just as for other kinds of liberalism, for the liberalism of fear Machiavelli’s
influence has been at most negative: as a contrast to what the liberalism of fear itself
might look like, illuminating some of its emphases but not directly advocating them. But,
as we shall contend, Machiavelli can also be a positive resource for such a liberalism, on
the one hand in providing a nuanced account of a kind of calculus of fear and cruelty in
political life, and on the other in laying down some of the rudiments of a prudentialist
take on politics. Finally, in the conclusion, we offer some brief remarks about the
consequences of all this for how we might think about issues of political identity in the
history of ideas.
Pluralism
That even and especially the ‘diabolical’ Machiavelli of Il Principe might be a negative
resource for liberalism was argued with greatest aplomb by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin, 1979;
cf. Ball 1995: 65–82). A brief look at Berlin will show something of how Machiavelli
can be taken as a negative resource. This viewpoint takes it that Machiavelli, himself no
liberal, nonetheless contributed to the possibility of liberalism, or at least to one version
of liberalism as a general perspective of toleration and pluralism. In 1953 Berlin deliv-
ered his tour de force of a paper on the originality of Machiavelli; the full text was not
published until 1972 (Berlin, 1979). Berlin contended that the true originality of Machia-
velli lay in the implicit assumption of the incommensurability of values that was the
implication of his works. This, Berlin claimed, was what accounted for the ‘scandal’
produced by Machiavelli’s writings. Berlin, in effect, saved Machiavelli for liberalism –
at least on a broad conception of liberal pluralism. For if values are incommensurable
then the way is left open, if only on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds, for
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‘empiricism, pluralism, toleration, compromise’ (ibid.: 78). Thus, for Berlin, Machia-
velli’s work forms part of the basis of ‘the very liberalism that Machiavelli would surely
have condemned’ (ibid.: 79).
Berlin’s point was that what was at stake in Machiavelli was not an opposition
between morality and something else (immorality of some sort), but one that oper-
ated – in the plural – between rival moralities. What was at issue was not the
opposition between a cold political calculability and the moral consciousness of
Christianity but between two alternative moralities, albeit one in effect pagan, the
other Christian:
This is not a division of politics from ethics. It is the uncovering of the possibility of more
than one system of values, with no criterion common to the systems whereby a rational
choice can be made between them. This is not the rejection of Christianity for paganism
(although Machiavelli clearly preferred the latter), nor of paganism for Christianity (which,
at least in its historical form, he thought incompatible with the basic needs of normal men),
but the setting of them side by side, with the implicit invitation to men to choose either a
good, virtuous, private life, or a good, successful, social existence, but not both. (Berlin,
1979: 71)
Such, for Berlin, was the source of Machiavelli’s ‘originality’, and the true source of
his scandal. The point, perhaps, was not so much whether this was the correct
Machiavelli on the basis of a reading of the texts; rather the point was about
reception – implications for value pluralism was the effect Machiavelli had whether
he willed it or not. On the other hand, different consequences surely apply if this is
indeed the ‘wrong’ Machiavelli (since, after all, other interpretations might yield
different implications, if any, for liberalism), and it is not difficult to contend that it
is indeed the wrong one.
Berlin’s view was that Machiavelli’s originality lies in exhibiting the existence of
distinct value spheres. Yet perhaps this makes of Machiavelli rather too much of a
precursor of dramatic Weberian invocations of the warring gods, even though Berlin’s
own value pluralism rather lacked the tragic implications of that. In any case, a more
orthodox yet arguably more accurate reading would surely hold that Machiavelli
recognizes one moral value sphere, broadly speaking – in spite of his unquestioned
anti-clericalism, which is a different thing – the Christian one, but recognizes that
political conduct requires occasional deviations from it in being, if only on occasion,
non bono. Indeed, it could be said that Machiavelli inhabits a single moral universe
precisely insofar as he contends that political realism compels one at times to depart
from it. For him, politics is not another morality in itself, even though it sometimes
entails tactical departures from ordinary morality. This, too, means that we are further
away from the kinds of hard-edged political realism espoused by later writers such as
Max Weber than is usually thought. For Weber, politics was essentially, if ultimately,
linked to violence (Weber, 1991: 126); for Machiavelli the link though permanent
was, at it were, more latent, more contingent, less ‘necessary’. But that, as we shall
see, is not least because Machiavelli held to no coherent and general science or
vocation of politics in any case.
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The satirical effect
Nonetheless, even if we cannot invoke a political ‘value-sphere’ as such in Machiavelli’s
works, this does – if only on account of the latent possibility of violence – make the
demands of political life different from other, more mundane demands. And if we grant
this much, does this view have consequences for how we see Machiavelli’s resonances
with liberalism? One way is to regard Machiavelli as sending us warnings about the
temptations of power, and this, we shall see, is a theme that is integral to a different kind
of liberalism from Berlin’s, the liberalism of fear.
This is what we might call the satirical model. And again it represents a negative
resource for liberalism rather than a positive one. Some strands of the Enlightenment
were precursors to this. As Rousseau famously wrote of Machiavelli in The Social
Contract: ‘Whilst pretending to teach lessons to kings, he taught great lessons to people’
(Rousseau, 1997: 95). Thus Machiavelli’s Il Principewas, in effect, an educational satire
– intended or not – on political power; even a clandestinely republican tract (Machia-
velli, 1998: xxii). Spinoza in the Political Treatise had observed that Machiavelli, ‘ever
shrewd’, was showing in Il Principe that a ‘free multitude should beware of entrusting its
well-being entirely to one person’ (Spinoza, 2016: 531). This, again, is Machiavelli not
as outright enemy but as ‘educator’. Or consider Diderot and his article on ‘Machiavel-
lianism’ in the Encyclope´die (Diderot, 1876: XVI, 32–3; cf. Gay, 1996: 286–7;
Meinecke, 1957[1924]: ch. 12). Here Diderot separates the man and his work. Machia-
velli, says Diderot, was a courageous man who endured torture with fortitude. But his
work in Il Principe invokes tyranny as an ideal. One would think that this would
hardly be likely to endear Machiavelli to the Enlightenment. And yet, Diderot argues,
Il Principe is in fact a warning directed at a free citizenry. It is, then, a satire on power.
It is as if, argues Diderot, Machiavelli is telling the citizens that this is what will befall
them if they submit themselves to the mastery of a prince; ‘voila` la beˆte fe´roce a` laquelle
vous vous abandonnerez’ (Diderot, 1876: 33). In other words, a text such as Il Principe is
structured – whether Machiavelli intended this or not – to function as a kind of self-
defeating prophecy. Machiavelli shows what political subjects should fear and not
simply what princes should do.
Now, this is precisely what we mean by Machiavelli as negative resource. Machia-
velli has not ceased to play this role. Indeed for a contemporary variant of the
Machiavelli-as-satire argument that is more overtly directed to liberalism, and – as we
shall see – specifically to the liberalism of fear, we can turn to the work of Bernard
Williams (Williams, 2005; Osborne, 2008; and see Sagar, 2016 for a very high-quality
account). Here, too, Machiavelli represents a kind of satire on the capabilities of power.
For Williams, the issue raised by Machiavelli is to do with the ordinary – but serious –
temptations of politics; as he puts it, not the issue of politicians as criminals but that of
politicians as crooks (Williams 1981a: 55; Osborne, 2014). From crook to criminal is
not, however, necessarily such a large jump; here we have ultimately the famous prob-
lem of political ‘necessity’, of dirty hands, and, by derivation, the typically liberal
‘distrust’ of politics – the whole hermeneutics of suspicion with which liberalism sur-
rounds politics (see Hardin, 2002). The idea here is that those who obey the logic of
political reason are not necessarily bad people in an absolute moral sense; it is rather
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political necessity, however one is to decide on that, which compels them to act in certain
ways. Thus certain kinds of liberalism extend their tolerance even to the perpetrators of
wicked things. In this spirit, Williams, for instance, invokes what he specifically calls
‘Machiavelli’s thesis’ that
. . . the responsibilities of government are sufficiently different from those of private indi-
viduals to make governmental virtue a rather different matter from individuals – or rather
(and this is very much the point) from that of individuals who are being protected by a
government. (Williams, 2005: 157)
In other words Machiavelli has exhibited, in a way that is useful to a liberalism
that is not utopian or meliorist so much as generically suspicious of power, the
potentially, and inevitably, diabolical nature of politics; that politics is inherently
dangerous in the sense that it – sometimes necessarily – invites virtues that are
strictly speaking contrary to the rules if not of virtu` per se then of what is normally
understood by moral virtue. This, at least in a putatively liberal age, makes political
power generically dangerous. Williams refers to this ‘Machiavelli thesis’ also as the
‘anti-tyranny argument’, to the effect that ‘precisely because of their peculiar pow-
ers and opportunities, governments are disposed to commit illegitimate actions
which they will wish to conceal’ (Williams, 2002: 207). Machiavelli, Williams
observes, takes power – not justice, right, or the good – to be the basic material
or element of politics. In this it is a sort of mirror-image of any variant of liberalism
that is suspicious of political power per se:
Like The Prince, it [liberalism] takes seriously power and the surrounding distributions and
limitations on power in any given situation. It is a close relation of Machiavelli (in that
incarnation, not in his virtuous republic persona); very roughly, it has the same sense of
what is important and is on the other side. (Williams, 2005: 59; cf. Williams, 2002: 208)
It is on the other side, indeed, because Williams envisages Machiavelli’s listeners – the
addressees of Il Principe – as being different from his originally designated readers,
princes and those in power. For Williams, Il Principe has in the context of modern
liberalism a universal audience: it addresses all of us since we are all governed, all
subject to power and its potential abuse. If the first task of any politics is to solve the
Hobbesian problems of disorder, cruelty and fear, liberalism, or at least the liberalism of
fear, recognizes – as Hobbes did not – that the solution can always become part of the
problem; for instance, in the form of an overbearing state or concentrated forms of
economic power (Williams, 2005: 59). Such a perspective, with its reminders from
Machiavelli, is illustrative of the truth that representative, liberal democracy is not
plebiscitary democracy, that rulers are not merely functionaries of the governed; hence
that, all the more, the governed need to be suspicious of those who rule, including and
perhaps especially those who rule in their own name. Hence the need in our democracies
not for a blind trust in the political class, but a systemic political distrust; and a distrust
that is, precisely, political and not moral – not concerned so much with the moral
peccadilloes of politicians but with the normal, if frightening, temptations of politics.
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Williams himself invoked the concept of the liberalism of fear in his work, seeing a
suspicion of the cruelties that can be consequent upon the use of political power as being
integral to that (Williams, 2005). The term itself, however, was coined by Judith Shklar
(Shklar, 1998; cf. Forrester, 2011 and 2012 for some of the history; and, more negatively,
Muller, 2008). Shklar’s article on the liberalism of fear dates from the late 1980s, but
aspects of her conception of it long pre-date that. The term itself was used in Ordinary
Vices (1984) but the idea was also surely present in earlier works such as Legalism (1964:
5–6) where it appears under the rubric of a ‘barebones liberalism’, a politics of ‘permanent
minorities’, and even – albeit, as it were, in embryo – in her first book After Utopiawith its
call for a ‘reasoned scepticism’ in politics (1957: 272–3). The point behind the idea was
not to displace other forms of liberalism or indeed other kinds of politics, but to emphasize
a bedrock importance of liberalism, in the prevention of cruelty (Shklar, 1984: 5–20).
Fundamental to liberalism, Shklar argued, is not justice or even liberty in a positive sense
but the prevention of the excess or abuse of power. All governments – and not just all
governments – are capable of cruelty; and the liberalism of fear prioritizes that suspicion
above all others. The liberalism of fear is the permanent suspicion of power.
Now one might think that Machiavelli might be, as he clearly was for Williams, at
least a negative resource for Shklar. In fact he was more like simply anathema, and it is
this position that we shall want to contest in what follows. For her, if one fears fear itself
above all, then Machiavelli can only be a monster, someone who – in Shklar’s view –
actually advocates a politics of cruelty and is certainly an apologist for it (see Shklar,
1984: 205–7). For Shklar, then, Machiavelli is not after all ‘another Hobbes’ – a thinker
of some obvious use for liberalism – but a straightforward enemy (ibid.: 207). In the
liberalism of fear, the primary and non-negotiable enemy is cruelty; for from cruelty
comes fear, and from fear comes loss of freedom (ibid.: 7–44). Machiavelli, for Shklar,
turned cruelty into policy. In this, Shklar contrasted Machiavelli with her own proto-
liberal hero, Montaigne:
In The Prince, Machiavelli had asked whether it was more efficient for a self-made ruler to
govern cruelly or leniently, and had decided that, on the whole, cruelty worked best. Mon-
taigne raised the question that the prince’s victims might ask: Was it better to plead for pity or
display defiance in the face of cruelty? There are no certain answers, he concluded. Victims
have no certainties. They must cope, without guide books to help them. The second of the
Essays deals with the sadness of those whose children and friends die. And the third suggests
that one might take precautions against the terrors of princes. If there were an established
review of the deeds of princes as soon as they died, their passion for posthumous fame might
restrain them here and now. Even Machiavelli had noted that an indiscriminate butcher was
not likely to enjoy the best of reputations in history, even if he should have succeeded in all
his enterprises. Montaigne was only too aware of how cruel the passion for fame made
ambitious princes, and he did not really place much hope in any restraining devices. But
by reading The Prince, as one of its victims might, Montaigne set a great distance between his
own and Machiavelli’s classicism. (1984: 10–11; cf. Viroli, 1998: 176, n. 10)
One can argue about this, and indeed attempt to redeem Machiavelli both against
Shklar yet for the liberalism of fear. There are good grounds for this even from
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within the history of ideas. Montaigne himself was hardly an outright anti-
Machiavel, as is obvious on a reading of, among others, the first essay of the third
book of the Essais on the ‘useful and the honourable’. Here Montaigne acknowl-
edges the periodic necessity of, in effect, the non bono. Politics here is largely a
matter not of outright and unwavering principles but of prudence. A prince some-
times has to do the bad thing: ‘But if he did it without regret, if it did not grieve him
to do it, it is a sign that his conscience is in a bad way’ (Montaigne, 2003: 736; cf.
making a parallel point, Williams, 1981a: 62). As for honesty and instrumentalism,
Montaigne acknowledges that real politics entails elements of each; and yet where
he does seem to counter Machiavelli more or less directly it is in the idea that
one can have a coherent strategy at all. The early contributions to the first book of
the Essais figure Montaigne attempting to show that the same strategy can lead to
different results, and that different strategies can lead to the same result. Shklar
observes that these reflections are ‘aimed at Machiavelli’ (Shklar, 1984: 10). And
yet Montaigne’s emphasis is not so contrary to Machiavelli’s own views. In the
Discorsi different things bring about different results and it is, indeed, impossible to
decide on an invariably best form of action. For instance, Hannibal’s (cruel) strategy
in Italy was wholly different from Scipio’s (lenient) strategy in Spain, and yet it
brought the same results (Machiavelli, 1996: 262–3). What is required on Machia-
vellian terms is of course virtu` (ibid.: 263); which might be translated not just in
terms of ability or courage but more generally in terms – at least terms that will be
relevant to the liberalism of fear – as something like prudential strength (cf. Machia-
velli, 1988: 103–4). The political actor who has virtue in this sense is one who is
experienced in judging when and how to act, based on the given materials and an
instinct for the given moment. Prudential virtue also implies creativity and an
unwillingness to give up; after all, even if fortune is ineffable, precisely because
it is ineffable there is always scope for new possibilities; hope is always possible in
a world without the apparent securities of providence (Machiavelli, 1996: 199).
What Machiavelli provided, then, was not a fixed doctrine or calculus of political
action but reminders, examples taken from history, designed to illuminate how one
might act in particular situations – and situations in Machiavelli, just as for the
liberalism of fear, are always particular. In other words, Machiavelli himself was an
advocate not of fixed protocols but of prudence when it comes to political life.
Machiavelli and cruelty
To illustrate this prudential theme, let us take the specific question of cruelty in
Machiavelli. The reason for this is obvious; it is that cruelty, or rather fundamental
resistance to it, is the central concept of Shklar’s conception of the liberalism of fear
and yet in denying any relevance to Machiavelli she denies herself this time a
positive resource that might have been used. For instead of simply a reductive
celebration of cruelty, Machiavelli delivers a kind of nuanced calculus of it. This
calculus is not, obviously, a ‘liberal’ one as such, but it does show the complexities
that any account of cruelty from the perspective of the liberalism of fear would have
to confront.
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If it is certainly the case that politics is not a separable moral sphere for Machiavelli,
then it is indeed a domain in which one has to know when and how to act; one has to
develop judgement in choosing when and what is necessary. Sometimes, for Machia-
velli, cruelty or at least the non bono is indeed necessary. But Machiavelli’s message on
this score, contra Shklar’s emphases, is, in effect, be good if you can, albeit if only for
reasons of (political) expediency. In general anyway a prince should ‘not deviate from
right conduct if possible, but be capable of entering upon the path of wrongdoing when
this becomes necessary’ (Machiavelli, 1988: 62). You have to be non bono at times
because other people certainly will: ‘If a ruler who wants always to act honourably is
surrounded by many unscrupulous men his downfall is inevitable’ (ibid.: 54). But gen-
erally it is better to be bono.
In fact it appears that whether we regard cruelty in terms of Berlin’s categories of
either the pagan-political or from a Christian point of view, cruelty for Machiavelli
is certainly to be regretted. Some have gone further and even claimed that cruelty is
regarded as one of the cardinal vices by Machiavelli (de Grazia, 1994: 83 ff.) This is
possibly overstating the matter, or at least making the issue more one-dimensional than
it=is. But a case can be made for it nonetheless. Above all in that very singular text, the
Istorie Fiorentini, Machiavelli declared that cruelty is straightforwardly and self-evidently
a bad thing both in itself and in relation to the ends of government (e.g. Machiavelli,
1998: 98–9). Or in certain places, such as at chapter 10 of book 1 of the Discorsi, cruelty
is criticized more or less unreservedly and goodness and beneficence are highly praised
(Machiavelli, 1996: 31–3; 1998: 95 and 161). History condemns the tyrant not just
because tyranny does not confer glory and honour, but because tyranny, at least as a
general means of government, does not tend to work, its residue being only ‘infamy,
reproach, blame, danger, and disquiet’ (Machiavelli, 1996: 31). And when cruelty or the
non bono more generally are condoned what is at stake is not an advocacy of political
cruelty or non bono as an ethos as such but at most periodic cruelty, periodic non bono
behaviour – and even then often only the show of cruelty; or at least the show of a
willingness to stand up to one’s enemies – reduced to the scale of a temporarily applied
and hence limited political technique. But at no point does Machiavelli counsel evil,
the non bono, or cruelty as integral to any general strategy of politics.
Machiavelli’s insistence on the limited merits of cruelty – that cruelty is never good
but sometimes necessary – is not least a polemical, indeed somewhat sardonic, riposte to
Seneca’s advice to Nero against cruelty in his De Clementia and the Cicero of De
Officiis. This does not mean, however, that the theme is there simply for rhetorical,
contrarian effect. Rather, the theme of cruelty is one through which Machiavelli devel-
ops his sense, more widely, of prudence in politics. Too much cruelty does harm. In this
cruelty is akin to fear; used prudently cruelty can prevent further need for it, but used
endemically, aside from being definitely non bono, it tends to fail (Machiavelli, 1988:
33). Just as with fear in general, situations where imprudent cruelty has led to more
cruelty can result in an inescapable spiral. Even in Il Principe, where cruelty is unsur-
prisingly given more sanction than in the Discorsi, Machiavelli holds that those who are
persistently cruel tend to defeat the object of holding on to their principalities; rather, if
bad things must be done, it is important to do them at the beginning and more or less all at
once and then have them over with (ibid.: 33; Machiavelli, 1976: 41). It is, to put it
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crudely, a sort of ‘least-worst’ prudentialism of cruelty and the non bono; as little as
possible, but then for the wider good.
Again, this is as much a matter of prudence as it is of conviction. Rulers must avoid
being despised by the people, not least for their own safety; to avoid conspiracies against
them. Fear is one thing, outright hatred another; and of course there is a wide terminol-
ogy of fear in Machiavelli – often, for example, fear or temere, avere paura and cognates
are better translated as something like ‘respect’ (see Machiavelli, 1998: xxxiii). One
needs, certainly, to generate respect. Perhaps doing so entails robust behaviour at times;
but in fact, trickery appears to be a better strategy than outright non bono behaviour. The
prince must be a fox to recognize traps and a lion to frighten the wolves, but being a fox
is probably more important (Machiavelli, 1988: 61). Again, however, this is a matter of
tactics and a knowledge of the specific situation; hold to the good when you can, do the
bad thing only if you have to and if you do the bad thing avoid cheapening the currency
of power by doing it too often. Indeed, as Mauricio Viroli has pointed out, Machiavelli in
fact never posits a ‘theory’ of political conduct at all. Steeped in the classical rhetorical
tradition, more often than not he gives different views and takes them to extremis;
providing maxims but not a systemic or general approach as such. As Viroli is right
to stress, there is nothing like a ‘science of politics’ in Machiavelli (Viroli, 1998: 1). If
we look for that we are looking for the wrong thing.
But none of this – tactics, rhetorical emphases – makes cruelty ever bono. Cruelty
contravenes morality whether seen from either a Christian or a ‘pagan’ perspective,
indeed from any perspective. Of Agathocles of Sparta Machiavelli writes in a famous
passage that it is not virtue ‘to kill one’s fellow citizens, to betray one’s friends, to be
treacherous, murderous and irreligious; power may be gained in such ways but not
glory . . . [H]is appallingly cruel and inhumane conduct, and countless wicked deeds,
preclude him being numbered amongst the finest men’ (Machiavelli, 1988: 31; cf. Kahn,
1986, and on glory see Owen, 2017). Cruelty is always bad; but worst of all when
endemic. In the Discorsi Machiavelli famously instances Caligula, Nero and Vitellius
for whom ‘the eastern and western armies were not enough to save [them] and so many
other criminal emperors from the enemies whom their wicked customs and their mal-
evolent life had generated for them’ (Machiavelli, 1996: 32). This also, importantly,
bears out the difference between armies and citizens. Soldiers, Machiavelli claims, tend
to cruelty, perhaps because they are used to the cruelty of military discipline; and the
tyrant emperors were those most dependent on the soldiery and so most, ultimately, at
their mercy. In fact military matters – in effect, discipline – are one area where cruelty is
more commonly justified, but that is a special case (albeit one no doubt complicated by
the preference for citizen militias over mercenaries). Only with an army is it necessary to
be persistently cruel or always to hold cruelty in reserve. Otherwise, there has to be a
prudent timeliness and minimalism in one’s use of cruelty, if it is to be deployed at all.
Cruelty says Machiavelli is to be ‘well used’ [bene usate] (Machiavelli, 1976: 41;
cf. Machiavelli, 1988: 33).
At any event, most of the cruelty in Il Principe specifically concerns, as Leo Strauss
and J. G. A. Pocock were to emphasize in such different ways, the foundations of power,
the setting up of new principalities, Cesare Borgia being the model specifically of a new
prince rather than, so to speak, a generic one (Strauss, 1958; Pocock, 1975: 158):
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And it must be understood that a ruler, and especially a new ruler, cannot always act in ways
that are considered good because, in order to maintain his power, he is often forced to act
treacherously, ruthlessly or inhumanely, and disregard the precepts of religion. Hence, he
must be prepared to vary his conduct as the winds of fortune and changing circumstances
constrain him and, as I said before, not deviate from right conduct if possible, but be
capable of entering upon the path of wrongdoing when this becomes necessary. (Machiavelli,
1988: 62)
Chapter 7 of Il Principe as a whole is about new princes. Cruelty may be what you do at
the beginning, but it is ultimately unsustainable. It is tied, specifically, to moments of
political inception rather than longer-term security. It is true that in this context Machia-
velli – in chapter 3 – invokes the idea that if one is to be cruel at all it is better to be
wholly ruthless rather than doing things half-heartedly; ‘men should either be caressed or
crushed’ (1988: 9). But that is precisely because cruelty is a bad thing to do; it needs to be
done quickly and decisively, before moving on. This is why cruelty is best delegated, and
then – if at all possible – disowned. Cesare Borgia delegated unsavoury measures to
Remirro de Orco in the Romagna, but later had him chopped up in the public square, in
effect ‘punishing’ him for his contribution (ibid.: 26). This both generated respect for
Cesare Borgia and removed a problem. One can complain that this is cynical, and yet the
fact that cruelty is best left to someone else indicates its problematic nature for Machia-
velli and his refusal to condone it outright as a general strategy (cf. on this Walzer, 1977:
324; Williams, 1981a).
Moreover, Machiavelli holds that cruelty can prevent cruelty. Cesare Borgia had a
reputation for cruelty – and not just a reputation – but actually did good things, whereas
the Florentines were generous at Pistoia in 1501 (neglecting to punish the ring-leaders of
violent riots) but in the long term this led to bloodshed and ruin, in other words to further
misery – a short sharp shock would have been better (Machiavelli, 1988: 58; see also
Machiavelli, 1958a: 115). Now, writers such as Judith Shklar herself have rejected this
idea that there might be an economy of cruelty, while themselves admitting that all
regimes, even the best of liberal regimes, to an extent rely on means – for instance,
imprisonment – that can be described as cruel or which at least – like even the rule of law
– induce fear. And yet Machiavelli’s logic here seems fairly undeniable. The irony is that
a little bit of harshness in the short term can lead to less in the long term, and in this sense
even conventional morality is served – one is actually being bono. But then so much
about Machiavelli is about time; knowing when to be harsh, knowing when to be lenient,
knowing when to be parsimonious, knowing when to be generous. ‘We must wait for
Time, which is the father of truth’ (Machiavelli, 1958b: 144). Cruelty and the capacity
for evil are there, certainly, but even in Il Principe they are predominantly presented as
limited, if essential, tactics and not as integral to the essence of politics per se.
Tactics not government
Where does this get us? Overall it shows – in the context of the prioritization of cruelty
that is central to the liberalism of fear – the extent to which cruelty is a more nuanced
concept than one might suppose, especially insofar as it is so even in the context of a
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thinker such as Machiavelli who – even by someone as astute as Shklar – is widely
supposed to have unequivocally advocated it. Beyond that, it helps us to see two kinds
of thing.
First, in relation to Machiavelli himself, it endorses Viroli’s viewpoint that there
is no general ‘machiavellian’ sense of politics at all, whether as a ‘science of
politics’ or even as a generalized ‘art of government’. This, by the way, is quite
in line with the early, pre-liberal, pre-modern reception of Machiavelli, which did
not see in him a generalized politics. The scandal of Machiavelli here appears to
have focused on Machiavelli’s supposed irreligion rather than any positive concep-
tion of politics perceived to be generically malign – cruel, evil or otherwise. As
Felix Raab demonstrated in his classic study half a century ago, Machiavelli had
become a controversial figure by the 1580s, at least in England, not as the purveyor
of an evil politics but as an emblem of the idea of irreligious government. Machia-
velli was in fact generally appreciated for his political insight, that is, as a political
tactician, but most writers of the period certainly could not accept the idea of
‘politik religion’, the idea of religion itself as a cynical, political device (Raab,
1965: 90; cf. Procacci, 1995: ch. 8). Irreligion aside, Machiavelli showed that tactics
mattered; but this did not necessarily entail the endorsement of some kind of alter-
native political morality as such. Political tactics, it might be said, entail a knowl-
edge of the non bono but this is not non bono per se; it is only that to govern men
one must know their nature and so, at least at times, be like them. Sir Francis Bacon
appears to have stated this point of view most directly:
For it is not possible to join the wisdom of the serpent with the innocence of the dove, except
men be perfectly acquainted with the nature of evil itself; for without this, virtue is open and
unfenced; nay, a virtuous and honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to
correct and reclaim them, without first exploring all the depths and recesses of their malice.
(Bacon, quoted in Raab, 1965: 74)
Tactics are not the same as government. There are no general Machiavellian tactics
that would amount to general principles of government, a science of the state or a science
of politics in general. Indeed it is another irony that Machiavelli’s writings should come
to represent the negative foil for the development of conceptions of the art of government
in the early-modern period. It was in this context that Michel Foucault argued that
Machiavelli represented the end of an era not the beginning of one; that the notions
of the art of government, the continuous government of ‘reason of state’, took
Machiavelli as a foil, not as a precursor (Foucault, 2007: 65; cf. Viroli, 1992). In
relation to the contested development of doctrines of police and raison d’e´tat anti-
Machiavellianism becomes a genre in its own right not just an ideological reaction
(Foucault, 2007: 91). Machiavelli appeared, at least in Il Principe, to restrict himself to
thinking of political power in terms of an externality to the principality involving
combating exterior dangers and not entailing intrinsic questions of governing a people
and territory. By contrast, in the burgeoning literature on government in the 16th
century – for instance, in the writings of Guillaume de La Perrie`re – the problem of
political power is defined as being immanent to the state:
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Machiavelli’s entire analysis is aimed at defining what keeps up or reinforces the link
between prince and state, whereas the problem posed by reason of state is that of the very
existence and nature of the state itself. (Foucault, 2001: 316)
In this sense, Machiavelli’s problematic had more to do with the micro-politics of
power rather than with the general arts of government, and far more to do with a
prior paradigm of political culture than the subsequent one centred on the governmen-
tality of the state.
Prudential liberalism
This brings us to our second point, which is to do more specifically with Machiavelli’s
relevance for modern liberalism. Of course, the Machiavellian prince is an illiberal
figure. But on the basis of the liberalism of fear, that minimalist form of liberalism that
holds that cruelty is the greatest enemy of liberty, Machiavelli has an obvious resonance:
just as we have seen with Williams’s account of the ‘Machiavelli thesis’. This is the
Machiavelli as satirist of power, an enemy of liberalism certainly, but illuminating
precisely for its giving grounds for suspicion of political power. But Machiavelli also
has a more positive rather than precautionary role to play in relation to the liberalism of
fear. This, then, is Machiavelli as a positive rather than simply a negative resource. We
have in Machiavelli the priority of fear itself as perhaps the basic problem of politics.
No other political theorist, not even Hobbes, has made fear so central. Machiavelli is a
great diagnostician of the mutuality of fear. As he says: men are driven by two things,
fear and love, but fear is the more important (Machiavelli, 1988: 59). Machiavelli
explores how, for example, when princes begin to be hated and have conspiracies ranged
against them, their fear is quickly transformed into offences against good conduct and so
onward to tyranny; and how likewise both nobles and the masses quickly come to fear
such tyranny and departure from the laws. Fear breeds fear; one has to counter it with
tactics, but one also has to use fear – to balance fears against fears. Even from a liberal
point of view, at least a realist rather than a utopian one, what is important is not to avoid
fear altogether – all political power, even for Shklar, rests at least in part upon fear – but
to prevent it from spiralling into a kind of ‘fear trap’, where fear and cruelty become
endemic, to prevent its being excessive, to make it the fear, as it were, of justice rather
than of cruelty. But either way, and even for Machiavelli, such traps help nobody; neither
the people nor the prince. Of course, Machiavelli put this political doctrine of fear to ends
that were certainly not liberal, but what he encourages is a realism about fear that is more
useful than the utopian idea – present even in Hobbes – that there might somehow be a
terminus ad quem with regard to it, a means of settling the matter (and of course the
Leviathan is nothing if not a utopia) once and for all. On the contrary, the politics of fear
is open-ended and ongoing. If the liberalism of fear represents a liberalism without
illusions or guarantees so in Machiavelli’s world there are no guarantees any more than
there are illusions; history is about remembering examples rather than a continuous
story; disorder or potential disorder is the norm, present crises are endemic rather than
prefatory to a long-deferred order (see on this Tillyard, 1944; cf. Yack, 1996). The tasks
of politics are never-ending.
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This prudential emphasis on the ongoing tasks of a politics without closure is, again,
of some constructive utility, surely, to the liberalism of fear; a case of Machiavelli being
a positive not just a negative – ‘satirical’ – resource. The liberalism of fear needs
prudentialism. Political thought from Hobbes to Rawls has done us a disservice in this
sense (Dunn, 1985). There is no ‘science of politics’ that can do away with fear; rather
fear has to be restricted, balanced; it has to be engaged tactically, subject to constant
scrutiny and criticism. One can see how prudence and the governance of fear are con-
nected, in a manner that could in fact come straight from the ‘negative’ perspective of the
liberalism of fear:
No government should ever believe that it is always possible to follow safe policies. Rather, it
should be realised that all courses of action involve risks: for it is in the nature of things that
when one tries to avoid one danger another is always encountered. But prudence [prudenzia]
consists in knowing how to assess the dangers, and to choose the least bad course of action as
being the right one to follow. (Machiavelli, 1988: 79; Machiavelli, 1976: 85–6)
Again, it is not at all a question of simple-mindedly assimilating Machiavelli for liberal-
ism. That anyway would be impossible. Machiavelli is certainly no liberal when it comes
to prudence, least of all in Il Principe. Chapter 7 alone – which is a celebration of both
prudence and virtu` – is enough evidence of that. Indeed, from the perspective of the
liberalism of fear prudence run amok is itself something to dread; in illiberal guise it can
become the manipulative politics of the skilled and devious demagogue or can lead in the
direction of those apparently Machiavellian ‘malcontents’ so prominent in the Tudor and
early Stuart theatre (Shklar, 1984: 204). But what Machiavelli provides are reminders that,
even in the vastly different context of modern liberalism, politics cannot do without
prudence. The liberal tradition has more typically emphasized rules, rights and institutions,
and in its more utopian forms idealized constitutional measures, rather than the kinds of
savoir-faire necessary for political rule. But Machiavelli himself emphasized the extent to
which constitutional arrangements themselves could be prudent; for instance, in balancing
powers against each other so that cities or republics might thrive on the tension of dissent
rather than descending into civil war (this, in sum, was the difference between the histories
of Rome and Florence) (Machiavelli, 1996: 13–14; cf. Machiavelli, 1998: 6–7). Machia-
velli’s beloved constitutional founders – Lycurgus, Romulus – have a symbolic role in this
sense; they exhibited prudence in founding constitutional arrangements that would last and
yet not run into stasis or, as with Solon in Athens, to speedy extinction.
The emphasis on prudence also draws in the importance of character in politics. Again
this is germane, in a positive way, to the liberalism of fear. Usually in liberal political
theory, matters of prudential politics are reduced to procedures (transparency, duty of
disclosure, conformity with the law) not as metis or practical intelligence. There is a
utopian element to much of this liberalism; it aims to bring about the good, rather than
forestall the bad. Against this, and contemporaneously with Shklar’s article on the
liberalism of fear, John Dunn invoked the idea of a prudential liberalism against the
utopian liberalism characteristic of so much political philosophy (Dunn, 1985). Pruden-
tial liberalism is consonant with the liberalism of fear in that it emphasizes hazards to be
avoided rather than positive goods to be pursued, but it adds the emphasis on judgement;
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that political power involves agents who have to choose, where necessary, what it is
necessary to do. Shklar’s and Williams’s liberalism of fear had its paragons; Montaigne,
Montesquieu, Constant. The liberalism of prudence, for Dunn, has another, yet over-
lapping, lineage; Aristotle, Montesquieu, Tocqueville – and Machiavelli. These were
writers who emphasized the prudential aspect of politics, none more so than Machiavelli.
Political judgement has to encounter contingency; ‘the diversity of hazards to which
human collective life has always been exposed and of the profoundly distur-
bing . . . configuration of such hazards which it confronts at present’ (ibid.: 168). Crucial
here is something akin to the Machiavellian notion of the subietto of politics, the given
material of what one confronts, which is why Dunn insists that prudential liberalism has
to be ‘sociologically sensitive’ (ibid.: 169; Machiavelli, 1976: 27). One has to know what
one is dealing with; that is part of practical, political knowledge, knowing how to
accommodate oneself ‘to the causal properties of existing fields of power’ (Dunn,
1985: 169). And also knowing when to take action; for just as with Machiavelli’s prince
one has to know when to act as well as how to act under given circumstances; to know, as
it were, how to work with fortune as well as to discern its hazards.
The prince is always thrown into novelty and an unknown future; hence Machiavelli’s
particular concern for the new prince, the new principality. No one has posed with such
starkness the predicament of doing something new in politics, of having to act without
foundations (Althusser, 1999). In liberal politics there is a gap between principle and
action that is not characteristic either of forms of governance that do not rely on prin-
ciples at all or those which attempt to deduce forms of action from their principles,
whether on the model of a politics of conviction or on the basis of, say, utilitarianism.
Hence this notion of liberal politics as a prudential enterprise has implications for how
we think about political virtue. Obviously, in the context of liberalism, this will not be
the Machiavellian virtu` of tough-minded resolution. Nonetheless, not least as insulation
against luck and misfortune, and because of the open-endedness of politics, political
actors need character. Of course this would be entirely different fromMachiavelli – after
all, the liberal ‘virtues’ would not be instances of virtu` – and yet Machiavelli might be a
resource. Prudential liberalism would perhaps emphasize the ‘ordinary virtues’ of pol-
itics; ‘dispositional virtues’ such as willingness to compromise, tolerance and free
inquiry (Dunn, 1985: 168–9). If one is prudent one weighs judgements in the balance,
and is not captured either by reductive desires or over-baked principles.
Now, when it comes to the liberalism of fear and the question of character, it is usually
negative dispositions that are mentioned. The liberalism of fear is, after all, itself a
‘negative’ liberalism, emphasizing avoidance of the bad rather than provision of the
good. Fundamental to Shklar’s liberalism of fear is obviously the aversion to cruelty
(1984: 7–44; 37), followed at some distance by a reluctance to indulge hypocrisy,
betrayal and a common liberal temptation, misanthropy. But Shklar also contends,
rightly, that liberalism requires positive characteristics, above all the ability to accom-
modate compromise, contradiction and complexity:
Far from being an amoral free-for-all, liberalism is, in fact extremely difficult and con-
straining, far too much so for those who cannot endure contradiction, complexity, diversity
and the risks of freedom. (Shklar, 1984: 5)
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Even these, though, are negative characteristics in a sense, entailing willingness to let go,
to tolerate, combined with what Williams calls the ‘habit of reluctance’; ‘an essential
obstacle against the happy acceptance of the intolerable’ (Williams, 1981b: 63). What is
salutary here is only that character does matter. In ‘Politics and Moral Character’,
Williams argued – in a true prudential, and, one is tempted to insist, constructively
post-Machiavellian spirit – that politicians need to be good most of the time and when
they are not good they need to be the sort of people who know they are not doing good
and who are ashamed of it: ‘The point . . . is that only those who are reluctant or disin-
clined to do the morally disagreeable when it is really necessary have much chance of not
doing it when it is not necessary’ (Williams, 1981a: 62; cf. Osborne, 2014). This is not
necessarily Machiavelli’s own position (though as we have seen, it was a point made by
Montaigne) but the point is in a sense a Machiavellian one; that what is necessary has to
be determined on the basis of experience, character and prudence. Necessity is not just
‘given’, in the form of floods or earthquakes that determine what one must do from
outside; rather what is to count as a necessity is also often the product of a choice, and
one always with fine and debatable margins (cf. Machiavelli, 1988: 108).
All this makes prudential liberalism an, as it were, deeply undoctrinal component of
an equally undoctrinal liberalism of fear. The liberalism of fear counsels an unequivocal
suspicion of power as if nothing were good and bad in itself but that power makes it so.
This makes it what Shklar originally called a ‘barebones’ liberalism, meaning not just
that it was minimalist but that it was basic in the sense that other attitudes, aspirations
and beliefs could be built on to it; a point underscored by Williams in insisting that the
liberalism of fear is a kind of universalism that deals with basic fear, after which ‘the
liberalism of fear will move to more sophisticated conceptions of freedom, and other
forms of fear, other ways in which the asymmetries of power and powerlessness work to
the disadvantage of the latter’ (Williams, 2005: 60). In other words, if the liberalism of
fear is a barebones liberalism this does not mean that there can be no sinews, no organs,
no bodily flesh that can envelop and animate it. And these at times may even look like
socialism, may look like conservativism, or at least they will be the products of the
prudential consideration of what can realistically be done (Dunn, 1985: 168). Prudence is
what decides what is required at what particular time. This liberal sense of prudence
might be seen as being Machiavellian in operation – being an endless intercourse
between virtue, fortune and necessity – but deeply un-Machiavellian in spirit, above all
in being unheroic (ibid.). Where Machiavelli wanted glory, the liberalism of fear coun-
sels reminders to people as to ‘what they have got and how it might go away’ (Williams,
2005: 60). Paradoxically, such reminders can come fromMachiavelli himself as much as
from anyone else, even a Locke or a Mill.
Conclusion
This article has sought to show that Machiavelli is not just a negative resource for the
liberalism of fear but also – through his analyses of political tactics, fear and cruelty and
through his advocacy of something like a prudential politics – potentially a positive one.
All this may be so, and yet we have repeatedly insisted that Machiavelli himself is in no
way a liberal. He is not even a ‘precursor’ to liberalism, as someone like Berlin would
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have it. And yet there is a lesson here, finally, about political identity in the history of
ideas more generally. The assumption is often that particular thinkers should entirely
inhabit one or other political ideology (hence the constant attempts to show that Hobbes
is either a proto-liberal or an authoritarian, or that Machiavelli is either a republican or a
proponent of Realpolitik) and that the task of political theory is to decide which. So many
different schools in the history of political thought divide over such sorting attempts. But
such attempts to sort particular thinkers into particular categories are almost always
somewhat staged and mythical. Thinkers belong to their own time, but also to many
others and so also to differing kinds of ideological allegiances. Indeed it is possible to
have deep relevance for a political ideology without being possible to sort into it at all.
The case of Machiavelli’s is of exactly this kind; not a precursor to liberalism, certainly
not himself an ideological liberal of any sort, yet somehow endlessly implicated in
liberalism and its complex and variegated history.
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